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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : PRIORITY 2 
JANEINA & MIKE MILLER : Case #20011014-CA 
Defendants/Appellants. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for contributing to the delinquency of 
a minor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-2301 (Supp. 2002). This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(c)(Supp. 
2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The State responds to three issues presented by the 
Appellants/Defendants: 
ISSUE ONE: Did the State produce sufficient evidence in its 
case in chief to prove proper venue? 
1 
Objections to proper venue are waived if not made before trial. Utah 
ode Ann. § 76-1-202(2) (1999); State v. Lovell 758 P.2d 909 (Utah 1988). 
ISSUE TWO: Did the State properly use the video tape in the 
*ial? 
Prior inconsistent statement made by witnesses at trial who are subject 
) cross examination concerning their prior statements are not hearsay. URE 
01(d)(1)(A). 
ISSUE THREE: Did the court to find the appellants/defendants 
uilty of both alternative crimes charged? 
There is no error in charging alternative offense. State v. Montova. 910 
.2d 441, 443 (Utah App. 1996); URCr P 4(i). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules relevant to this appeal are attached in 
iddendum C-I: 
Utah Code Ann. 1176-1-202(2) (1999) 
URE 801 
URCrP 4(i) 
Utah Code Ann. §32A-12-203 (2001) 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-2301 (Supp. 2002) 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-201 (1999) 
2 
URE 802 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 11, 2001, information were filed in juvenile court alleging that 
Michael Miller and Janeina Miller had committed acts in violation of two 
alternative statutes. Alternative one alleged each Defendant violated Utah 
Code Ann. § 32A-12-203 (2001), supplying alcohol to a minor or in the 
alternative, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-2301 (Supp. 2002). At trial 
held on November 8, 2001, both Appellants/Defendants were found guilty of 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor (Trans. 167-168); Trial Minute 
Entry Janeina & Michael Miller, November 8, 2001. Michael and Janeina 
Miller appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 10, 2001, Deputies Leonard Isaacson and Vance Norton were 
dispatched to what was described as a juvenile alcohol party at 589 East 1500 
South, Vernal, Utah (Trans. 9; 110-111).1 
deputies Isaacson and Norton were Deputies for the Uintah County 
Sheriffs Department (T. 8; 110). Brenda Roth lived in an apartment complex 
next door to the apartment of the Miller's (T. 36-37). Brenda Roth testified 
that she lived in the Vernal area and was a neighbor to the 
Appellants/Defendants (T. 36-37). 
3 
Upon arrival, Deputy Issacson went to the rear of the residence and made 
mtact with co-defendants (Trans. 9-10). While talking to the co-defendants at 
lis time, Deputy Issacson observed several "chairs sitting around" (Trans. 9) and 
stween ten and fifteen empty beer bottles (Trans. 13). Deputy Issacson had the 
npression that there had been a party at the residence earlier that day (Trans. 
0). 
Deputy Issacson did not identify any specific violation of law during his 
litial conversation with the defendants and then returned to the front of the 
ssidence (Trans. 11). 
When Deputy Norton arrived, he made contact with two juveniles who 
rere in the front of the fourplex at the address that was reported as being the 
arty (Trans. 111). These minors were identified as Jerimiah Roth and Amanda 
Ixmz (Trans. 111). During the initial contact with these juveniles, Amanda 
Lunz attempted to conceal a thirty two ounce "Red Dog beer" which was 
pproximately one half full (Trans. 111). While talking to the minors, Deputy 
Norton noticed that both minors had bloodshot eyes and an odor of alcohol 
Trans. 112). Both minors told Deputy Norton that they had consumed alcohol 
Lt the Miller residence (Trans. 112). 
4 
After Deputy Issacson returned to the front of the residence, he began 
talking to two juviniles, identified as Luke Roth and Christina Kunz (Trans. 12-
15). 
Luke Roth admitted consuming alcohol and told Deputy Issacson that he 
obtained the alcohol from the Appellant's/Defendant's residence (Trans. 13-14). 
Luke also told Deputy Issacson that he had permission from his mother to be at 
the Appellant's/Defendant's home consuming alcohol (Trans. 14). 
Deputy Issacson also talked to Christina Kunz (Trans. 14). Christina had 
also been consuming alcohol (Trans. 14)2. She told Deputy Issacson that she 
consumed the alcohol both inside and outside of the Appellant's/Defendant's 
residence (Trans. 14-15). Christina also told Deputy Issacson that both 
Appellants/Defendants were present while she consumed alcohol (T. 15). 
During the continued investigation, Deputy Vance Norton also talked to 
Luke Roth (Trans. 113). During this conversation Luke Roth indicated that the 
Appellant/Defendant Michael Miller had purchased the alcohol which was 
consumed that night (Trans. 113-114). Luke told Deputy Norton that both 
Appellants/Defendants were present while the alcohol was consumed by the 
minors (Trans. 114). During the investigation, Deputy Norton also observed 
2Deputy Isaacson testified the Christina Kunz tested positive for alcohol 
on a portable breath tester. 
5 
Le condition of the backyard (Trans. 116). Deputy Norton described a bucket 
Lat was overflowing with empty beer bottles which were the same brand and 
ze as the bottle Amanda Kunz attempted to conceal when Deputy Norton first 
Lade contact with her (Trans. 116-117). Other empty beer bottles were also 
mattered around the yard (Trans. 117). 
At some point while the Deputies were talking to the juveniles, Brenda 
oth arrived (Trans. 15). Brenda is the mother of two of the juveniles, Luke and 
erimiah Roth (Trans. 15). After being advised of her Miranda rights, Brenda 
,oth told Deputy Issacson that she had give permission for her sons to go to the 
defendant's home and consume only one beer (Trans. 16). Ms. Roth told Deputy 
ssacson that she felt it would be alright because her boys would be supervised 
Trans. 16). 
A significant portion of the interviews with Brenda Roth, Amanda Kunz 
nd Luke Roth were recorded by Deputy Issacson's video recording device in his 
ervice vehicle (Trans. 15-18). That video was used during the trial (Trans. 19, 
:5, 47, 62 and 83). 
At trial, witnesses changed their stories from those told to the Deputies 
md recorded on June 10, 2001 (Trans, of testimony of Brenda Roth, Christina 
£unz, Luke Roth, Amanda Allred, Deputy Leonard Isaacson and Deputy Vance 
Norton). 
6 
After observation of the witnesses on the stand and viewing the video tape 
made on June 10, 2002, the findings of the court were consistent with the 
statements made by witnesses on June 10, 2001 (Trans. 163-166). 
Furthermore, the court found that the in court testimony which was 
inconsistent with the statements made at the scene on June 10, 2002 was 
incredible (Trans. 164). The court went so far as to suggest that the witnesses 
perjured themselves (Trans. 164). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the convictions on the basis raised below. 
The issue of venue was waived by the Appellants/Defendants for failure to 
raise the issue before trial. The State proved both venue and jurisdiction. 
The State properly used the video as evidence of the crime both as direct 
evidence and impeachment evidence. 
There was only a conviction of one of the alternative counts charged in the 
information. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE ONE: Did the State produce sufficient evidence in its case in 
chief to prove proper venue? 
Appellants/Defendants claim that the State failed to meet its burden of 
proof when the Deputies failed to testify that the incident occurred in Uintah 
7 
ounty or Vernal City. Though couched in terms of jurisdiction, 
ppellants/Defendants argument is a challenge concerning venue.3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202(2) (1999) states, "All objections of improper 
lace of trial are waived by defendant unless made before trial." Objections to 
enue must be raised before trial or it is waived. State v. LovelL 758 P.2d 909 
Jtah 1988). 
Even though Appellants/Defendants cannot now raise the issue of venue, 
tie State presented evidence of proper venue in its case in chief from both law 
nforcement Deputies and lay witnesses. 
Appellants/Defendants ignore the fact that Brenda Roth was called as a 
fitness for the State and testified that she lived in the "Vernal" area and was a 
eighbor to the Appellants/Defendants (Trans. 36-37). There is no requirement 
hat the State prove jurisdictional grounds or proper venue with law enforcement 
fitnesses. Even though Brenda Roth eventually became an adverse witness for 
3Appellants/Defendants reference as authority both Utah Code Ann. §§ 
6-1-201 & 76-1-202, which sets forth the requirements of jurisdiction and 
enue. See Aplt. Br. at 11. Even though Appellants state the issue is one of 
urisdiction, the only claim made is that the State did not prove proper venue 
ly not having either Deputy testify that they were in Uintah County or Vernal 
}ity. Determination of proper county to have a trial is an issue of venue, not 
urisdiction. 
8 
the State, she was called by the State and given opportunity to testify before the 
State impeached her testimony (Trans. 36). 
Both Deputies testified that they were employed by the Uintah County 
Sheriffs Department and were on duty (Trans. 8-9; 110). The natural inference 
to draw from this testimony was that they each were responding to a call within 
Uintah County.4 In addition, Christina Kunz testified that she was visiting with 
her aunt and uncle for part of the summer (Trans. 55). Deputy Isaacson also 
testified that Christina Kunz was from "somewhere out on the [Wasatch] front" 
(Trans. 14). 
The State's evidence, when taken as a whole from the State's witnesses, is 
that the incident occurred at 589 East 1500 South (Trans. 9; 110), Vernal (T. 36). 
See State v. Clark 2002 UT App 108 HI, 2002 WL 538031 (unpublished), citing 
State v. Mead. 2001 UT 58 UU65-67,27 P.3d 1115,1132 (Appellate inquiry stops 
if there is some evidence or reasonable inferences which support each element of 
the crime). 
Even if, arguendo, this court does not find that venue or jurisdiction was 
properly established, the error was not obvious. Appellants/Defendants have not 
4
 "'[a]n inference is a deduction as to the existence of a fact which 
human experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be drawn from 
proof of other facts.'" State v. Hester. 2000 UT App 1591116, 3 P.3d 725, 
quoting Manchester v. Dugan. 247 A.2d 827, 829 (Me. 1968). 
9 
ised any issues of ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel for 
ppellants/Defendants at the trial stage made no mention of the States failure 
prove venue or jurisdiction during his arguments for directed verdict (Trans. 
25-128). He also made no arguments that the State failed to meet its burden of 
*oving venue or jurisdiction in any of his closing arguments (Trans. 157-160). 
Appellants/Defendants cannot now claim that their counsel was competent 
; the trial stage and yet he did not identify an obvious error that arguably could 
ave resulted in an acquittal. 
The more persuasive reasoning is that there was no error at all at the trial 
;age, and that counsel for Appellants/Defendants was effective and did not raise 
xe issue of venue or jurisdiction because it was not a valid claim. 
3SUE TWO: Did the state properly use the video tape in the trial? 
Appellants/Defendants claim that the only proper use of the video tape is 
)r impeachment, and therefore, could not be introduced and viewed by the court 
rior to using it for impeachment purposes. Appellants/Defendants catagorize 
he video as hearsay evidence which is not generally admissible under Rule 802, 
f the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The recorded statements on the video are not hearsay, and the video was 
properly introduced. 
10 
A statement is not hearsay if:... The declarant testifies at the trial 
. . . and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and 
the statement (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, or 
The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own 
statement, in either individual or a representative capacity; 
URE 801(d)(1) 
In this case, all persons on the video were either called as witnesses, 
(Leonard Isaacson, Trans. 8-35; Brenda Roth, Trans. 35-54; Christina Kunz, 
Trans. 54-77; Luke Roth, Trans. 77-91; Amanda Allred, Trans. 91-101; Jeremiah 
Roth, Trans. 102-110; and Vance Norton, Trans. 110-125) or were defendants. 
The State established proper foundation for its admission in court. Deputy 
Isaacson testified that his patrol vehicle was equipped with a recording device 
(Trans. 15), that it was used to record some of the events relating to the 
investigation of these charges (Trans. 15), that the recording device was 
functioning properly when activated and within range (Trans. 16), that he knew 
how to operate the recording device (Trans. 16), that he had an opportunity to 
view the video prior to the trial (Trans. 16), that it was a accurate representation 
of the events depicted in the video (Trans. 16-17). The State then offered the 
11 
ideo as direct evidence.5 It was not entered as an exhibit, and not given an 
rfiibit number. 
The trial court then asked the Appellant's/Defendant's attorney if he had 
ny objection to the introduction of the video and the defense attorney did not 
bject on any ground (Trans. 17). Appellants/Defendants now argue that the 
ipe was not properly admitted because it is not part of the court record, 
[owever, it is not part of the official record because it was returned to the 
ustody of the officer (Trans. 169). The video had evidence of other crimes not 
elated to the Appellants/Defendants on the same videotape (Trans. 17-18). 
Appellants/Defendants rely on State v. Sibert. 310 P.2d 388 (Utah 1957), 
Dr the proposition that hearsay evidence can be properly used to impeach. 
However, the case before this court is not a case involving the use of 
Learsay evidence. As argued previously, the tape did not contain hearsay 
vidence, but evidence that is not considered hearsay under the rules. [Ibid]. 
5There were no magic words used such as, "I now offer this video as 
vidence", rather, the Attorney for the State offered the evidence by asking 
he court to "review the videotape" (Trans. 17). This offer is not unlike either 
he State or the Defendant calling a witness to testify, by using words such as 
I call John Doe". There is no requirement that when calling a witness the 
ittorney use magic words clarifying the witnesses function, such as, "I call 
bhn Doe as a live witness for the purpose of asking direct examination 
[uestions". The offer to "review the videotape" was the States offer for the 
udge to consider its contents as evidence of the commission of the crime. 
12 
Since the information on the tape is not hearsay under Rule 801 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, then its use functioned similar to a witness. The fact 
that later witnesses then testified contrary to what was contained on the tape did 
not prejudice the proceedings any more than conflicting witness testimonies 
would. The court was free to observe the demeanor of witnesses on the stand 
and draw conclusions as to which of the two theories was the truth. 
Appellants/Defendants correctly state that the Court of Appeals reviews the 
admission of evidence for correctness State v. Mickelson. 848 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 
1992), however, this issue was not preserved for appeal at trial. The attorney for 
Appellants/Defendant at trial was asked if he had any objections to the court 
viewing the tape before it was played (Trans. 17). Counsel for 
Appellants/Defendants told the trial court that he had no objections (Trans. 17). 
Since there was no objection to the use of the video at the trial stage, the 
court could only examine this issue under the plain error standard. Monson v. 
Carver. 928 P.2d 1017,1022 (Utah 1996). 
The policy considerations for this rule were discussed in State v. Holgate. 
2000 UT 74,10 P.3d 346. In Holgate, the court said that one reason parties are 
prohibited from raising an issue for the first time on appeal is to prevent 
attorneys from strategically failing to object at the trial level in hopes of 
enhancing the ability to receive a favorable decision on appeal. Id. at 1111. 
13 
In this case, the attorney at the trial stage clearly failed to raise the issue 
the trial stage, even though the trial court specifically asked him if he had any 
Sections to its admission (Trans. 17). 
Even if this court reviews the admission of the video under the plain error 
andard, it is clear the use of the video did not prejudice or harm the 
ppellants/Defendants. All witnesses on the tape were given an opportunity to 
>stify truthfully before they were impeached using the video tape (Brenda Roth, 
rans. 36; Christina Kunz, Trans. 55; Luke Roth, Trans. 77). Brenda Roth and 
hristina Kunz acknowledged that they had told the Deputies a different story 
lan what they testified to at trial (Brenda Roth, Trans. 38; Christina Kunz, 
'rans. 63). Luke Roth claimed that he could not remember what he told the 
deputies the night of June 10, 2001, even after viewing a portion of the video 
ape (Trans. 83). 
The defense theory at the trial stage was based on witnesses at the trial 
laiming that they had lied to Deputies at the time of the investigation, 
therefore, the claim that the use of the tape prejudiced the findings is without 
nerit. 
Furthermore, the tape was not solely used in the direct examination of 
)eputy Issacson. It was used as impeachment during the testimony of Brenda 
loth (Trans. 45), Christina Kunz (Trans. 62) and Luke Roth (Trans. 83). Thus, 
14 
it was used in the fashion Appellants/Defendants now claim it should have been 
used. 
Even though the video was not made part of the official record, enough of 
the statements made on the video are contained in the official transcript to 
understand the inconsistencies in the testimony (Brenda Roth, Trans. 39-47; 
Christina Kunz, Trans. 60-63; Luke Roth, Trans. 82-83). In addition, Deputy 
Norton testified without objection what Luke Roth and Amanda Allred told him 
concerning who supplied the beer and were it was consumed. (Trans. 112; 113-
116). 
Even without the use of the video during the direct examination of Deputy 
Isaacson, the use of the video during impeachment of witnesses and the other 
evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction. Therefore, even if there was error, 
it was harmless error. 
ISSUE THREE: Did the court to find the appellants/defendants guilty 
of both alternative crimes charged? 
The State was not prohibited in charging the defendants under alternative 
counts. State v. Montova. 910 P.2d 441, 443 (Utah App. 1996); URCr P 4(i). 
The final argument raised by Appellants/Defendants is without merit. The 
findings of the court are clear: the court found the Appellants'/Defendants' 
15 
;tions in violation of both alternative counts, but only sentenced them to one 
large (Trans. 167-168). 
Counsel for the Appellants/Defendants asked that the sentence be for 
supplying alcohol to a minor" (Trans. 167). 
The signed Trial Minute Entry of Janeina & Michael Miller only shows a 
mviction for one count of "Contributing Alcohol to Minors" [Addendum A] 
he signed sentencing Minute Entries only list a sentence for one charge 
Addendum B]. 
Therefore, the claim that Appellants/Defendants were sentenced for both 
rimes is without merit. 
The court may not have made the record clear with regard to convictions, 
ut it is clear that it never intended to impose a sentence or create a criminal 
ecord for either defendant on both alternative counts. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should affirm the convictions for Supplying Alcohol to a Minor, 
.^e State met its burden concerning venue, the video was properly used or was 
Lot harmful to Appellant's/Defendant's theory of the case at trial, and the trial 
:ourt did not sentence Appellants/Defendants to alternative crimes. 
16 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of September 2002. 
G. MARK THOMAS 
Attorney for the Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 3rd day of September 2002,1 caused to be mailed, by 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two accurate copies of BRIEF OF APPELLEE to 
Julie George, 32 Exchange Place, Suite 101, Salt 
Attorney for Appellants. 
, Utah 84111, 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
SWN EI( fH DISTRICT JUVENILE U 
780 West Main P.O. Box 1567 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(435) 789-1271 
i\ 
Case No. / ^ ^ 3 
<m=— 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH, In the interest of 
Ac] under the age of 18 years 
TYPE OF HEARING: D Arraignment) D^ Review • Order To Show Cause D Pretrial D Disposition 
ADVISED OF RIGHTS: • r.oiinRe.V^</^K-<^ kllUl^ • Prosecutor /Vi J^AJ-rrU<J'• 
PRESENT: ^
 A D Child D Mother D Father P.O. /V/f£ 
Incident 
D Other 
Work Hours Due. 
ORDER 
• Admit • Deny 
— Restitution Due_ 
D Dismissed 
$ Fine Due. 
QjttiAu. <^cJj CjfiLU^<*- 7TLuJU+l*?u£££f) aadLtcj #-/ (l4*M<Ux<J&* 
Incident. 
Work Hours Due. 
• Admit • Deny • Dismissed 
$ Restitution Due $. Fine Due« 
Incident D Admit • Deny • Dismissed 
. Work Hours Due. 
 
$ Restitution Due $ __ Fine Due. 
Incident. 
.Work Hours Due. 
• Admit D Deny • Dismissed 
$ Restitution Due $ _ Fine Due. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED BY THE COURT: Juvenile is to keep the court informed of all address and phone changes. 
NEXT HEARING IS SET FOR 
THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER NOTICE OF THIS HEARING. 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDER OF THIS COURT MAY RESULT IN YOUR BEING FOUND IN 
CONTEMPT OF COURT AND COULD RESULT IN PLACEMENT IN A DETENTION CENTER AND/OR 
WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGES. 
Filed:. 
8th DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT, STATE OF UTAH Elated this 
For UJ Uintah • Daggett D Duchesne County 
By: 
4 - day of /£/7Vpchir , 20 
Copy: • Delivered: • Child • Mother • Father 
• Other By: 
D Mailed: 
BY THE COURT 
JUDGE 
By: 
ADDENDUM B 
$Mto&\ 
I 
EIwTH DISTRICT JUVENILE (\,oK I 
920 E. Highway 40 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(435)781-9335 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH, In the interest of 
A child under the age of 18 years i ^ ^*-\x \ <J'7~ 
Case No. *\b?W 
ZJkZlllo. 
TYPE OF HEARING: D Arraignment 
ADVISED OF RIGHTS: D Counsel 
PRESENT: 
D Other 
• Review • Order To Show Cause • Pretrial • Disposition 
Prosecutor %4\_s \x 
UlMS^ D Mother D Father P.O. ^(Kj/^ 
Incident mCjnbHu. 
Work Hours Due >ur  . ^ $ Restitut 
ORDER 
D Admit D Deny 
ion Due 
D Dismisse 
$ 1 f D . y i n e Due. 
Incident D Admit • Deny • Dismissed 
$ Fine . Due . Work Hours JDue $ Restitution D.ue , r ^ u ej 
-M- imVQ mil\<h wn/p; Emoaq- £n h ^ d'mrtntto 
Incident 
^-.ftiy. nn (. 
WprkHours Due 
- - , • 
D Admit • Deny • Dismissed 
$ Restitution^ DUQ^ $ / Fine /Due 
7^ fU/Vft V?\ ito&/rt- T , ^ % ffi^rWMt 
-pn g. f M + / i r m i (if T h > >jr f?psyi V 
Incident 
Work Hours Due 
• Admit • Deny • Dismissed 
$ Restitution Due $ Fine Due 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED BY THE COURT: Juvenile is to keep the court informed of all address and phone changes. 
NEXT HEARING IS SET FOR 
THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER NOTICE OF THIS HEARING. 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDER OF THIS COURT MAY RESULT IN YOUR BEING FOUND IN 
CONTEMPT OF COURT AND COULD RESULT IN PLACEMENT IN A DETENTION CENTER AND/OR 
WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGES. 
|/11 0^1 Filed:. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED BY THE COURT: Juvenile is to keep the court informed of all address and phone changes. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-202(2) (1999) 
76-1-202. Venue of actions. 
(1) Criminal actions shall be tried in the county, district, or precinct where 
the oflFense is alleged to have been committed. In determining the proper place 
of trial, the following provisions shall apply: 
(a) If the commission of an offense commenced outside the state is 
consummated within this state, the offender shall be tried in the county 
where the offense is consummated. 
(b) When conduct constituting elements of an oflFense or results that 
constitute elements, whether the conduct or result constituting elements 
is in itself unlawful, shall occur in two or more counties, trial of the oflFense 
may be held in any of the counties concerned. 
(c) If a person committing an oflFense upon the person of another is 
located in one county and his victim is located in another county at the 
time of the commission of the oflFense, trial may be held in either county. 
(d) If a cause of death is inflicted in one county and death ensues in 
another county, the offender may be tried in either county. 
(e) A person who commits an incKoate oflFense may be tried in any 
county in which any act that is an element of the oflFense, including the 
agreement in conspiracy, is committed. 
(f) Where a person in one county solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or 
attempts to aid another in the planning or commission of an oflFense in 
another county, he may be tried for the offense in either county. 
(g) When an oflFense is committed within this state and it cannot be 
readily determined in which county or district the oflFense occurred, the 
following provisions shall be applicable: 
(i) When an oflFense is committed upon any railroad car, vehicle, 
watercraft, or aircraft passing within this state, the offender may be 
tried in any county through which such railroad car, vehicle, water-
craft, or aircraft has passed. 
(ii) When an offense is committed on any body of water bordering 
on or within this state, the offender may be tried in any county 
adjacent to such body of water. The words "body of water" shall 
include but not be limited to any stream, river, lake, or reservoir, 
whether natural or man-made. 
(iii) A person who commits theft may be tried in any county in 
which he exerts control over the property affected. 
(iv) If an oflFense is committed on or near the boundary of two or 
more countieB, trial of the offense may be held in any of Buch counties. 
(v) For any other oflFense, trial may be held in the county in which 
the defendant resides, or, if he has no fixed residence, in the county in 
which he is apprehended or to which he is extradited. 
(2) All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a defendant unless 
made before trial. 
History: C. 1968, 76-1-202, enacted by L. ment, effective May 2, 1994, inserted "or pre-
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-202; 1994, ch. 218, § 8. cinct" in the introductory language of Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- turn (1). 
ADDENDUM D 
URE 801 
ARTICLE Vm. HEARSAY 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the state-
ment is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies 
having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or 
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent The statement is offered against a party 
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representa-
tive capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption 
or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to 
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's 
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or 
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement 
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
ADDENDUM E 
URCrP 4 
Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses. 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indict-
ment or information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense 
has been committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the 
defendant is being prosecuted by using the^name given to the offense by 
common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the 
offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. An information 
may contain or be accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to make out 
probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropriate. Such things 
as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged 
unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities, 
written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by 
any name or description by which they are generally known or by which they 
may be identified without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning 
such things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presump-
tions of law nor matters of judicial notice need be stated. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an 
indictment or information. 
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at 
any time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the 
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an 
indictment or information may be amended so as to state the offense with such 
particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the 
same set of facts. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to 
inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to 
enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for 
a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten 
days thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. The court may, 
on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars 
may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as 
justice may require. The request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall 
be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the 
essential elements of the particular offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name 
contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso 
contained in the statute creating or defining the offense. 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual 
meaning unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal 
meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the 
indictment or information. 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information 
was based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall 
not affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on 
application of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, 
except upon a showing of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he 
proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed. 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to 
appear before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. 
Proceedings against a corooration shall be the same as against
 fl natural 
ADDENDUM F 
Utah Code Ann. §32A-12-203 (2001) 
32A-12-203. Unlawful sale or supply to minors. 
(1) A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise furnish or supply any 
alcoholic beverage or product to any person under the age of 21 years. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), a person who knowingly 
sells, offers to sell, or otherwise furnishes or supplies any alcoholic beverage 01 
product to any person under the age of 21 years is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) This section does not apply to the furnishing or supplying of an alcoholic 
beverage or product to a minor for medicinal purposes by "the parent or 
guardian of the minor or by the minor's physician or dentist, in accordanot 
with this title. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-12-8, enacted by L. ment, effective May 1,1995, substituted "Sub* 
1985, ch. 175, § 1; renumbered by L. 1990, section {ST for "Subsection {IT in Subsection 
ch. 23, § 132; 1991, ch. 49, § 1; 1991, ch. 241, (2). 
§ 30; 1995, ch. 20, § 70. Cross-References. — Sentencing for misd* 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
ADDENDUM G 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-2301 (Supp. 2002) 
CONTRIBUTING TO THE DELINQUENCY OF A Mtt 
76-10-2301. Contributing to the delinquency of a min< 
Definitions — Penalties. 
(1) For purposes of this part: 
(a) "Adult* means a person 18 years of age or older. 
(b) "Minor" means a person younger than 18 years of age. 
(2) Any adult who commits any act or engages in any conduct whi 
knows or should know would have the effect of causing or encouraging a ] 
to commit an act which woxild be a misdemeanor or infraction cri 
violation of any federal or state statute or any county or mimicipal ordi 
if committed by an adult is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (2) does not require that the minor be foi 
be delinquent or to have committed a delinquent act. 
(4) An offense committed under Subsection (2) is in addition to any 
pleted or inchoate offense which the actor may have committed persona 
as a party. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-2301, enacted by tion" in Subsection (2); added Subsecti 
L. 1999, ch. 249, § 1; 2000, ch. 105, § 1. redesignated former Subsection (3) as £ 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend- tion (4); and made stylistic changes, 
ment, effective May 1, 2000, added "or infrac-
ADDENDUM H 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-201 (1999) 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
76-1-201. Jurisdiction of offenses. 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he 
commits, while either within or outside the state, by his own conduct or that of 
another for which he is legally accountable, if: 
(a) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the state; 
(b) the conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt to commit an 
offense within the state; 
(c) the conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an 
offense within the state and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs 
in the state; or 
(d) the conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or 
conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense under the laws of 
both this state and such other jurisdiction. 
(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either the conduct 
which is any element of the offense, or the result which is such an element, 
occurs within this state. 
(3) In homicide offenses, the "result" is either the physical contact which 
causes death or the death itself. 
(a) If the body of a homicide victim is found within the state, the death 
shall be presumed to have occurred within the state. 
(b) If jurisdiction is based on such a presumption, this state shall retain 
jurisdiction unless the defendant proves by clear and convincing evidence 
that:"v'< 
(i) the result of the homicide did not occur in this state; and 
(ii) the defendant did not engage in any conduct in this state which 
is any element of the offense. 
(4) An offense which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by 
the law of this state is committed within the state regardless of the location of 
the offender at the time of the omission. 
(5) The judge shall determine jurisdiction. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-201, enacted by L. subsection (SXb); added "offenses" after "homi-
1973, ch. 196, S 76-1-201; 1996, ch. 54, § 1. ride* in Subsection (3); redesignated former 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- Subsection (3) as Subsection (4); added Subsec-
ment, effective April 29, 1996, divided Subsec- tion (5); and made stylistic changes, 
tion (2) into Subsections (2) and (3), adding 
ADDENDUM I 
URE 802 
Rule 802. Hearsay rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
Rule 802 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence 
(1974), and is the same as the first paragraph of 
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Cross-References. —Affidavits, taking and 
certification of, § 78-26-5 et seq. 
Contemporaneous entries and writings of de-
cedent as prima facie evidence, § 78-25-8. 
Judgment, entry of, U.R.C.P. 58A. 
Judgment roll in criminal case, contents and 
filing, U.R. Crim. P. 22. 
Marriage certificate, issuance and filing, 
§§ 30-1-6, 30-1-12. 
Official records as evidence, § 78-25-3; 
U.R.C.P. 44. 
Recording conveyances, § 57-3-101 et seq. 
